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I. INTRODUCTION
A six-pound baby boy in Bloomington, Indiana, who lived but
six days, has invoked a national rethinking of infanticide, parental
power under the common law to exercise jurisdiction over the care
of children, and the crucial issue of whether quality of life stan-
dards are more significant and fundamental than principles of
sanctity of life. "Baby Doe" was born a mongoloid, with conse-
quent mental retardation, and had a malformed esophagus that
prevented food from reaching his stomach.' Rather than authorize
* B.S., 1961, J.D., 1964, Indiana University; LL.M. 1975, Columbia University.
Professor of Law, Catholic University of America. This article was written
while Professor Smith was a Visiting Fellow at Clare Hall, Cambridge Univer-
sity, England, and the Fullbright Visiting Professor of Law and Medical Juris-
prudence at The University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, 1984.
1. See Van der Dussen, Givan: Court's "Doe' Action Set No Legal Precedent,
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corrective surgery, the parents chose to withhold food and medical
treatment-save pain killers-from their son.2
The county prosecutor learned of the parents' decision to stop
feeding the infant, and brought suit to remove Baby Doe from the
parents' custody.3 Since the parents' decision was based on the
medical opinions of advising physicians, however, the Monroe
County Circuit Court determined that no probable cause existed
for finding that Baby Doe had been neglected.4 On appeal, the In-
diana Supreme Court prevented interference with the parental de-
cision by affirming the circuit court orders.5 Before an emergency
appeal could be made to the United States Supreme Court, Baby
Doe died.6 Disclaiming the attachment of any judicial significance
to the case, Chief Justice Givan of the Indiana Supreme Court
stressed that the ruling was unwritten and, thus, could in no way
be used as legal precedent. 7 Firm legal precedent or not, the case
sparked action by the federal government to prevent hospitals re-
ceiving federal assistance from participating in future decisions of
a similar nature.8
Bloomington Herald-Telephone, Apr. 23, 1982, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as
Van der Dussen, No Precedent]; Van der Dussen, No Charges Will Be Filed in
Infant Doe Case, Bloomington Herald-Telephone, Apr. 19, 1982, at 1, col. 1
[hereinafter cited as Van der Dussen, No Charges Will Be Filed]; Van der
Dussen, Infant's Death Ends Feverish Appeal for Life, Bloomington Herald-
Telephone, Apr. 16, 1982, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Van der Dussen,
Death Ends Appeal]; Van der Dussen, High Court May Be Asked to Save
Baby, Bloomington Herald-Telephone, Apr. 15, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
2. See generally In re Baby Doe, No. GU 8204-00 (Cir. Ct. Monroe County, Ind.
Apr. 12, 1982).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. State ex rel. Infant Doe v. Baker, No. 482 5140 (Ind. Apr. 16, 1982), cert. denied
103 S. Ct. 394 (1983). A special guardian ad litem was appointed to perfect the
appeal. The legal issues to have been raised were: did the child have a right
under the fourteenth amendment to continue living; did the child have the
same rights as all others to procedural due process protections; and finally,
was this child denied equal protection because of its handicap? See generally
Van der Dussen, No Charges Will Be Filed, supra note 1.
6. See Van der Dussen, Death Ends Appeal, supra note 1.
7. See Van der Dussen, No Precedent, supra note 1.
8. Proposed Rules for Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to
Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846 (1983). In 1983, dur-
ing the first session of the 98th Congress, Senator Roger W. Jepsen intro-
duced S. 467 as a bill "to establish [a] governmental policy with regard to
respect for human life." S. 467, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 51,080
(daily ed. Feb. 3, 1983). Section 8 of the proposal sought to protect handi-
capped infants by forbidding federally funded institutions from withholding
"nutritional sustenance or medical or surgical treatment required to correct a
life-threatening condition if: (1) the withholding is based on the fact that the
infant is handicapped; and (2) the handicap does not render treatment medi-
cally contraindicated." Id. at 51,081. No definition of handicap was set out in
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This Article will suggest an approach to facilitate decisionmak-
ing where the concepts of quality of life and sanctity of life appear
to clash. It is hoped that a reconciliation of these two ideas will
provide an alternative to the increasing federal intervention in the
process of family decisionmaking vis-a-vis handicapped infants.
The construct will combine deontological standards with situa-
tional, or consequential, ethics. This unique synthesis will then be
placed within a sphere of expanded family advisers-medical, so-
cial, spiritual, legal, etc.-who are called into being with the birth
of a genetically defective newborn. The force of the construct
arises from the basic goal of man to minimize suffering, maximize
the social utility or purposes of life,9 and give living expression to
love of God and of mankind.10
The actual utilization of the construct can be likened to a bal-
ancing test, where the gravity of the harm in allowing life-sus-
taining actions for a handicapped infant is balanced against the
utility of the benefits stemming from the life-sustaining actions.
The gravity of harm is measured in terms of social, economic, reli-
gious and philosophical costs, while the utility of the benefits is
measured in terms of the positive consequences that flow to the
threatened individual, its parents, and society. To assist the bal-
ancing process, there must be a weighing of factors such as the
infant's long-range capacity for entering into relationships with
others.
Imperfect as considerations forming this construct may be, they
may help the family tackle the painful problems of a grossly de-
formed neonate or a genetically defective infant. Acting within
this spirit, the standards of quality of life and sanctity of creation
in no way challenge or obstruct one another. They serve neither as
palliatives or mitigating shields, nor as an apotheosis or glorified
ideal. Rather, they are mere aspects that complement each other
in a unified approach to decisional efforts. As such, they are
grafted to the proposed analytical construct which-if imple-
mented-would act to limit or possibly preclude government intru-
sions into the privacy and autonomy of the family unit in its
process of anguished decisionmaking.
the proposed legislation, which never passed in the Senate, nor was the re-
quirement of medically contraindicated treatment set out with clarity.
9. See G. SMrrH, GENETICS, ETmIcs AND THE LAw 1-4 (1981).
10. See McCormick, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern Medicine, in
How BRAVE A NEW WoRLD 339 (R. McCormick ed. 1981).
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II. THE FEDERAL "BABY DOE" REGULATIONS
A. The March 7, 1983 Version
1. Background
In addition to spawning an outburst of public emotion, the Indi-
ana Supreme Court's Baby Doe decision acted as a catalyst for
political action. On April 30, 1982, President Reagan referred spe-
cifically to the case of In re Infant Doe and pointedly reminded the
Attorney General of the United States and the incumbent Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services that Section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act" prohibits discrimination against all handicapped
individuals.12 Section 504 provides that "[n] o otherwise qualified
handicapped individual in the United States . .. shall, solely by
reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... 13
The Secretary accordingly issued a notice to health care provid-
ers on May 18, 1982, reminding them of the applicability of Section
504 to handicapped infants.14 While recognizing that hospitals who
receive federal grant monies do not always have complete or final
control over treatment in the face of contrary parental directives,
the Secretary nevertheless required that any parental efforts to
withhold care from a handicapped infant should not be aided by
the hospital. If a federally funded hospital were to withhold treat-
ment from such newborns, the institution would risk discontinua-
tion of federal assistance.15
The regulation promulgated pursuant to Section 504 was pub-
lished March 7, 1983, and became effective as a final interim rule on
March 22, 1983.16 The rule proposal was so closely linked to the
highly publicized Baby Doe case that the popular media dubbed
the regulations as the "Baby Doe Rules."' 7 The rules sought to
provide the full spectrum of medical care and food to all newborns
in the more than 6,400 hospitals receiving federal aid.18 This goal
was to be achieved by requiring federally funded hospitals and
medical institutions to post warnings in conspicuous places
throughout maternity wards, pediatric wards, nurseries, and inten-
11. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
12. The origins of the Baby Doe Regulations are set out in American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 397-98 (D.D.C. 1983).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
14. 47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (1982).
15. Id.
16. 48 Fed. Reg. 9,630 (1983).
17. See, e.g., Kamen & Russell, Court Strikes Down U.S. 'Baby Doe' Rule, Wash.
Post, Apr. 15, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
18. 48 Fed. Reg. 9,630 (1983).
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sive care nurseries. These warning signs explained that the failure
to feed and care for handicapped infants violated federal law, and
provision was made for a toll-free "hotline" telephone number to
make timely reportings of suspected violations.19 Additionally, the
Baby Doe Rules authorized the Department of Health and Human
Services to dispatch a "civil rights investigation squad" to investi-
gate all alleged violations. These investigators were given the right
to demand complete twenty-four hour access to all hospital
records and an opportunity for immediate and direct questioning
of all concerned parties. 20
2. Challenge in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler
The American Academy of Pediatrics and the National Associa-
tion of Children's Hospitals joined forces with the Children's Hos-
pital National Medical Center to maintain an action challenging
the validity of the Baby Doe Rules in American Academy of Pedi-
atrics v. Heckler. 21 These medical providers charged first that the
regulation was arbitrary and capricious, and that it intruded un-
necessarily into confidential relations between the family and the
physician.22 The group of challengers charged further that the
Secretary of Health and Human Services had acted beyond her
statutory authority, and had improperly dispensed with the feder-
ally prescribed assurance of public comment before the regula-
19. Id. The warnings were to read as follows:
DISCRIINATORY FAILURE TO FEED AND CARE FOR HAND-
ICAPPED BY FEDERAL LAW.
Any person having knowledge that a handicapped infant is being dis-
criminatorily denied food or customary medical care should immedi-
ately contact.
Handicapped Infant Hotline
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services
Washington, D.C. 20201
Phone 800-368-1019 (available 24 hrs. a day)
In the City of Washington, D.C. 863-0100
(TrY capability)
or
Your State Child Protective Agency
Federal law prohibits retaliation or intimidation against any per-
son who provides information about possible violations of The Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973.
Identity of callers will be held confidential.
Failure to feed and care for infants may also violate the criminal
and civil laws of your State.
Id. at 9,631.
20. Id. See also American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 398
(D.D.C. 1983).
21. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
22. Id. at 396.
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tion's issuance. 23
This challenge of the federal Baby Doe Rules came at a particu-
larly controversial point in time. Public debate over the plight of
severely mentally or physically defective newborns had reached a
zenith, partly as a result of new advances in neonatology that pro-
long the life of infants who would otherwise die shortly after birth.
Federal District Judge Gesell pointed out, however, that such life-
sustaining methods often preserve the life of an "infant who con-
tinues nevertheless to suffer from mental or physical defects so
great as seriously to impair the infant's expected quality of life and
chances for an independent existence." 24
Acknowledging the need for courts to be deferential to adminis-
trative decisionmaking,25 Judge Gesell nonetheless concluded that
the action undertaken by the Department of Health and Human
Services was "an arbitrary and capricious agency action" 26 that
failed to "satisfy the test of rationality."27 The court particularly
questioned the failure of the record to establish that various issues
of central concern had been considered prior to the promulgation
of the questioned rule. The court expressed concern that the
agency had failed to address issues such as: the "disruptive effects
of a 24 hour toll-free 'hotline' upon ongoing treatment of
newborns"; the potential for abuse by anonymous tipsters in trig-
gering a sudden descent of "Baby Doe" squads; the effects of such
a squad in "monopolizing physician and nurse time" and dis-
rupting efforts to maintain high quality infant care; and, finally, the
regulation's ultimate effect of forcibly removing a child from a hos-
pital, under the threat of subsequent termination of all federal
assistance, when parents direct the withholding of medical
treatment.28
The court, in American Academy of Pediatrics, recognized that
the power to make difficult, heart-wrenching decisions on whether
to forego life-preserving measures has traditionally rested within
the privacy of the family, in consultation with a physician.29 Judge
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 706 (2) (A) (1977). The Administrative Procedure Act requires
a right of notice, consultation, and comment before the promulgation of a
rule; however, the American Academy of Pediatrics court was "Well aware
that agency rulemaking must be considered deferentially and that this Court
is prohibited from substituting its own judgment for that of the agency if a
rational basis exists for the agency's decision." American Academy of Pedi-
atrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 399 (D.D.C. 1983).
26. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 399 (D.D.C.
1983).
27. Id. at 399.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 396 ('Traditionally, the difficult decision of when to withhold life-sus-
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Gesell outlined some of the factors that influence parental-physi-
cian decisions to treat handicapped infants: the risks of treatment
to the infant; the infant's quality of life if the newborn survives
treatment; the utility or value of prolonging such life-sustaining
measures when imminent death is inevitable; and, finally, the eco-
nomic and social costs of maintaining the infant in light of the im-
pact on the stability of the family unit.30 The court continued by
observing that there had been no weighing of these various factors,
nor any further balancing of the issues against various risks of
malpractice suits and professional discipline, which could well be
imposed upon both physicians and hospitals who find themselves
caught between this federal regulation and "established legal and
ethical guidelines."3 1 Judge Gesell further explained:
The Secretary did not appear to give the slightest consideration to the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of relying on the wishes of the parents who,
knowing the setting in which the child may be raised, in many ways are in
the best position to evaluate the infant's best interests. [NJ one of these
sensitive considerations touching so intimately on the quality of the in-
fant's expected life were even tentatively noted. No attempt was made to
address the issue of whether termination of painful, intrusive medical
treatment might be appropriate where an infant's clear prognosis is death
within days or months or to specify the level of appropriate care in such
futile cases. Means of funding the extensive care mandated by the regula-
tion and for allocating scarce medical resources between defective
newborns and other newborns or other patients were also apparently not
considered.32
By encroaching upon the privacy of parental decisionmaking,
the rule would seek to change the whole course of previously es-
tablished law. The Department of Health and Human Services
had, in essence, built an intrusive structure to control the parental
decision to withhold treatment of handicapped infants, an area tra-
ditionally placed beyond the government's regulation reach. Rec-
ognizing that the treatment of severely defective newborns does
not follow any customary standard of care, Judge Gesell con-
cluded that "the regulation thus purports to set up an enforcement
mechanism without defining the violation, and is virtually without
meaning beyond its intrinsic in terrorem effect."33
Finally, Judge Gesell even noted some concerns over the possi-
bility that the Baby Doe Rules exceeded the scope of Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. The court, in American Academy of Pediat-
taining treatment of a newborn has been one made within the privacy of the
physician-patient relationship, without interference by state or federal
authorities.").
30. Id.
31. Id. at 399-400.
32. Id. at 400.
33. Id.
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rics, found nothing in the legislative history of the Act to suggest
that Section 504 could be used as a monitor of the medical treat-
ments provided for defective newborn infants; nor could the court
identify anything remotely posturing a standard for preserving a
particular quality of life.34 The court did, however, acknowledge
that the statute was, on its face, subject to a very broad interpreta-
tion that may well authorize "some regulation of the provision of
some types of medical care to handicapped newborns."35 Judge
Gesell left the issue of Section 504's scope undecided, explaining
that further congressional action is needed to chart the extent to
which Section 504 should be applied in "such a sensitive area of
moral and ethical concerns." 36
B. July Reissuance
On July 5, 1983, the Department of Health and Human Services
(Department) reissued its "Baby Doe" Regulations in light of the
Gesell opinion.3 7 This time, the Secretary directed that public
comments were to be submitted by September 6, 1983.38 With four
exceptions, the new proposed rules were identical with the original
final interim rule. First, the so-called "hotline" notice was to be
posted only "in a conspicuous place in each nurses' station,"3 9
whereas the original rule required permanent posting in conspicu-
ous places throughout delivery wards, pediatric wards, nurseries,
and intensive care nurseries.40 Second, the notices were limited in
size to eight and one-half by eleven inches in size,41 whereas the
old regulation allowed the Department to send large posters of un-
limited size to hospitals.42 Third, the new regulations made listing
the local child protective agency's telephone number on the poster
mandatory, rather than optional.43 Finally, the proposed rules di-
rected each state's child protective services agency to set up and
34. Id. at 401 ('The legislative history of the section focuses on discrimination
against adults and older children and denial of access to federal programs.").
35. Id.
36. Id. at 402.
37. 48 Fed. Reg. 9,630 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84).
38. By November of 1983, over 16,000 comments were received and processed by
the Department of Health and Human Services. Telephone interview with
Susan Shalhoub, Office of Civil Rights, Department of Health and Human
Services (Nov. 29, 1983). Another source reports that by the closing date,
11,000 comments were filed, of which "the overwhelming majority" were
favorable. See Annas, Baby Doe Redux: Doctors as Child Abusers, 13 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP. Oct. 1983, at 26.
39. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,851 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.61(b)).
40. 48 Fed. Reg. 9,630 (1983).
41. Id. at 30,851 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.61(b)).
42. See Annas, supra note 38, at 28.
43. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,851 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.61(b)).
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maintain procedures designed "to prevent medical neglect of
handicapped infants" within sixty days of the effective date of
regulation.44
In the "Supplementary Information" section of the proposed
rules, care was taken to specify that Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act would not mandate treatment of an infant when it would
"not benefit medically from a particular treatment."45 More specif-
ically, "Section 504 does not compel medical personnel to attempt
to perform impossible or futile acts or therapies."4 6 Futile thera-
pies that merely prolong-in a temporary manner-the process of
death for a defectively born infant were not to be imposed.47 A
Section 504 violation would occur, however, when treatment is
withheld "because of the existence of a handicap and the handicap
does not render the treatment medically contraindicated."48
The Department of Health and Human Services failed to re-
solve the central problem pervading the whole of the final interim
rule: namely, the vagueness in the standard physicians are di-
rected to follow under the rules. Although the Department stated
that the "customary medical care" standard does not require treat-
ment that is "medically contraindicated," and, indeed, allows the
withholding of treatment based upon "legitimate medical judg-
ment,"49 these terms ultimately do nothing but muddy the waters.
The final interim rule later explained that ultimate physician re-
sponsibility "corresponds with the responsibilities of parents or
guardians under State child abuse and neglect laws to provide
medically indicated treatment for their children."5 0 As one ob-
server has noted:
The suggested definition is circular; 'customary medical care' is care that
must be provided to avoid violation of the child abuse and neglect laws.
The idea that standards are likely to be developed in any way but through
individual cases being decided by courts of law seems farfetched. Cer-
tainly ad hoc Baby Doe squads descending on hospitals in the middle of
the night are unlikely to be helpful to anyone. Nor does this 'standard'
provide any guidance to the nurses who are expected to use the hotline to
call for help in appropriate circumstances.5 1
In August of 1983, the Undersecretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services personally tried to assist in the devel-
opment of a mechanism that would assist health providers in com-
ing to grips with the issue of whether adequate, customary, or
44. Id. at 30,851 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.61(e)).
45. Id. at 30,852 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (emphasis in original).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Annas, supra note 38, at 27.
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acceptable care was being provided to defectively born infants.52
The Undersecretary suggested that local hospital committees-
dubbed Bioethical Review Committees-be established to deter-
mine the question of whether proper medical treatment was being
provided handicapped newborns. 53
The Undersecretary's proposal won the support of ten groups,
including The American Academy of Pediatrics and The American
Medical Association, which had opposed the Baby Doe Rules. 4
Such Bioethical Review Committees (much akin to ethical tribu-
nals) would be composed of doctors, hospital administrators,
clergy, and lay members, and would take on the duty of developing
guidelines for the treatment of handicapped infants and other sen-
sitive bioethical issues. 55 The committees could be convened auto-
matically when disagreements arose over the withholding of
treatment or upon the request of any hospital staff member, a fam-
ily member, or even a concerned member of the public.56 This is,
at least in theory, a sound proposal that would go far toward pro-
viding a support mechanism to a beleaguered family unit faced
with the ultimate responsibility for deciding the fate of a defective
newborn.
The desire of the federal government to provide health care
services to all citizens, and to prevent discrimination against the
handicapped in the administration of these services, is admirable.
But to formalize this into an overly broad and intrusive regulatory
scheme, which has at best scant foundation in case law,5 7 would
threaten the privacy of the family and destroy the code of confiden-
tiality existing between doctor and patient. Such regulations ig-
nore valid legal mechanisms, such as child protection laws in the
states,58 that have not been tried and found deficient.
C. The Final Rules
The final Baby Doe Rules were printed in January of 1984, and
were the product of nearly 17,000 comments submitted to the De-
partment of Health and Human Services.59 Although the Depart-
ment effected some changes in its attempt "to forge a cooperative
52. See Hilts, HHS Moves to End 'Baby Doe' Controversy on the Handicapped,
Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1983, at A2, col. 1.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The regulations were founded upon only four documented cases of "discrimi-
natory" denial of care for defective infants. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,848 (1983).
58. See Annas, supra note 38, at 27.
59. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622 (1984).
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approach," 60 the final rules still provided for the same basic mech-
anisms of federal intervention without provisions for a meaningful
standard. The changes were thus aimed more at muting the con-
troversy surrounding federal intervention, than at providing work-
able guidelines for the treatment of handicapped infants.
The new standard to be used in caring for defective infants was
stated as follows: "nourishment and medically beneficial treat-
ment (as determined with respect for reasonable medical judg-
ments) should not be withheld from handicapped infants solely on
the basis of their present or anticipated mental or physical impair-
ments."61 This new standard would appear to permit more room
for discretion in withholding treatment, as the language speaks of
"reasonable" medical judgments, and seems to allow some consid-
eration of the infant's defective condition. The basic problem with
the old proposed standard of customary medical care remains: the
standard is still too vague to justify the sanctions visited upon the
parties involved.
Acknowledging concerns reflected in public comments to the ef-
fect that the proposed warning signs posted in nurses' stations
could "have a disruptive effect on the provision of health care to
newborn infants," the Department responded by changing the re-
quirements for the sign.62 These changes were largely cosmetic,
however, as the Department's basic approach remained unaltered.
The sign no longer needed to be posted in nurses' stations, but
must still be placed "at any location where nurses and other medi-
cal professionals who are engaged in providing health care related
services to infants will be aware of the content of the notice."63
The sign has also continued to shrink in size, and must now be
only five by seven inches.64 In order to eliminate the possiblity
that viewers of the warning sign might believe that it implies past
improper conduct by the hospital, the Department now allows a
sign explaining that the hospital's policy is consistent with that of
the government's nondiscrimination requirements embodied in
Section 504.65 Finally, minor changes have been made in the re-
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1,651 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.54).
62. Id. at 1,625.
63. Id. at 1,626. This action was taken to remedy the concern expressed by medi-
cal providers that "posting [the signs] in the nurses' stations would continue
to make the notice conspicuous to distressed parents." Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1,625. This alteration was suggested by the Catholic Health Associa-
tion; in order to be allowed to put up such a sign, the hospital must first have
a procedure in use for "review of treatment deliberations and decisions con-
cerning health care for handicapped infants." Id.
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quired wording of the sign.66
There were two significant changes in the rules. Although not
required, the establishment of Infant Care Review Committees
(ICRC's) was encouraged in the 7,000 health care providing hospi-
tals receiving federal assistance.67 These ICRC's consist of at least
seven members from the hospital staff, with one designated to act
as "special advocate" for the infant.68 Under the final rules, the
ICRC's were encouraged to develop and recommend to participat-
ing hospitals guidelines for the withholding or withdrawal of medi-
cal treatment for infants suffering from life-threatening conditions.
The ICRC's also provide counsel in specific cases under review
where treatment is, in fact, withheld or withdrawn. The final rules
permitted only an advisory role for the ICRC's however, and thus
greatly limit the potential intrusion of a hospital review board.69
The second important change in the final rules was the lan-
guage found in the section called "Guidelines Relating to Health
Care for Handicapped Infants."7 0 This section provided "interpre-
tive guidelines" that boldly stated that no federal intervention will
occur where either of the following standards or conclusions were
met: (1) where reasonable persons with medical training conclude
that the treatment would be futile, or (2) where the treatment's
success is too unlikely, and thus the considered treatment will not
be of medical benefit to the infant (and could even harm the
infant) .71
66. Id. at 1,626. The Department of Health and Human Services explained that
such changes reflected the "deferrence to reasonable medical judgments."
Id. One example of the wording change is found in the heading of the sign:
the new sign's heading reads "Principles of Treatment of Disabled Infants."
67. Id. at 1,562 (to be codifed at 45 C.F.R. § 84.54).
68. Id.
69. Originally, the American Academy of Pediatrics suggested the hospital re-
view boards as a substitute for government mechanisms to enforce Section
504. The Department rejected this suggestion for the reason that the "essen-
tial element of this alternative proposal-that it separates the process from
the established legal framework governing decisionmaking by parents and
physicians, with no meaningful provision to ensure that they function in ac-
cord with this framework-makes the proposal unacceptable." Id.
More recently, the Child Abuse Amendments of 1983, see H.R. 1904, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), and S. 1003, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), seek to direct
the withholding of federal funds from those hospitals that withhold treatment
of handicapped at risk newborns to the infant's neglect or abuse. Treatment
could be withheld only if the baby in distress were irreversibly comatose or if
treatment would merely prolong dying and thus be considered inhumane.
See generally H.R. REP. No. 98-159, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
70. Id. at 1,653-54 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84).
71. Id. On May 23, 1984, the new regulations were found invalid. See American
Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The government has,
however, decided to appeal this decision. See Wash. Post, Aug. 18, 1984, at A2,
col. 3.
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III. BABY JANE DOE
A. Action Against The Parents
On October 11, 1983, another "Baby Doe" was born with a vari-
ety of tragic disorders including spina bifida (a failure of the spinal
column to close properly) and excess fluid in the brain. Dubbed
"Baby Jane Doe," she was born at the Stony Brook Hospital on
Long Island, New York. Attending physicians acknowledged that
she would die within two years without corrective surgery. Even
with surgery, she could survive only in a severely retarded and
bedridden condition. After consultation with other physicians and
members of the clergy, the parents refused to allow corrective
surgery.72
Subsequently, a Vermont "right-to-life" attorney having no di-
rect interest or relationship to the parties petitioned the New York
Supreme Court to intervene on the child's behalf.73 The plaintiff
circumvented the standing problem by appointing a guardian ad
litem, who then sought a judicial authorization for surgery to over-
ride the parents' decision to disallow remedial surgery.74 Although
the trial court actually ordered the operation, the appellate divi-
sion of the supreme court reversed and upheld the rights of the
parents in Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital.75
The New York Court of Appeals found that the state legislature
had, through the passage of Article 10 of The Family Court Act,
established detailed provisions designed to protect children from
injury and mistreatment, and to promote their general well-be-
ing.76 Under this legislation, the primary responsibility for initiat-
ing child neglect proceedings is vested in specific child protective
agencies which-with proper court supervision-are directed to
thoroughly investigate allegations of child neglect and report their
findings to the court before judicial proceedings are initiated.77
The decision warned that "judicial proceedings touching the fam-
ily relationship should not be casually initiated."78
The court further observed that there was a total failure to fol-
low the statutory scheme that the Legislature had designed specifi-
cally for the protection of children:
As the guardian conceded on oral argument, acceptance of the proposition
72. See Margolick, Battle for 'Baby Doe', N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1983, at B1, col. 5.
73. Id.
74. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 209, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (1983).
75. 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, (1983).
76. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 210, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1188, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63, 65 (1983).
77. Id. at 210, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
78. Id.
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he espouses would be to recognize the right of any person, without re-
course to the strictures of the Family Court Act, to institute judicial pro-
ceedings which would catapult him into the very heart of a family circle,
there to challenge the most private and most precious responsibility
vested in the parents for the care and nurture of their children-and at the
very least to force the parents to incur the not inconsiderable expenses of
extended litigation.
7 9
Refusing to enumerate the circumstances that would trigger judi-
cial protection of a child's interest, the decision merely observed
that there may be occasions where court involvement is
appropriate. 80
Other New York courts have, in various instances, given gui-
dance as to the parameters of parental autonomy in deciding to
discontinue the treatment of their children. Lower courts in New
York have determined that the adequacy of medical treatment
may be used as a norm or standard in considering cases of child
neglect.81 Furthermore, where a child has a "reasonable chance"
to lead a fulfilling and useful life, parental inaction in the face of
needed surgical interventions will not be permitted.82 Interest-
ingly, however, the New York Court of Appeals has held that
where treatment designed to prolong life offers no hope of recov-
ery, life sustaining efforts may be terminated.83 In a case where
excessive pain would not be encountered by the patient, however,
the same court ordered blood transfusions to sustain the life of a
terminally ill and profoundly retarded cancer patient.8 4
B. The Federal Response to Baby Jane Doe
The privately instituted action against the parents was only half
of the ordeal stemming from the Baby Jane Doe's case. On No-
vember 2, 1983, the federal government argued in court that the
failure by a federally supported hospital to order surgery for an
infant with severe birth defects violated the civil rights accorded
the child under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.85
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. In re Hofbauer, 65 A.D.2d 108, 411 N.Y.S.2d 416 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (parents
had the right to choose laetrile therapy under a licensed physician for their
eight-year-old child).
82. Application of Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 702, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965, 968 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1979) (court ordered surgery for an infant born with spina bifida).
83. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
84. Id. "[A] court should not in the circumstances of this case allow an incom-
pentent patient to bleed to death because someone, even someone as close as
a parent or sibling, feels that this is best for one with an incurable disease."
Id. at 382, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275-76.
85. See Barringer, U.S. Seeks Records of 'Baby Jane Doe,' Wash. Post, Nov. 3,
1983, at 1, col. 6.
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In the United States District Court in Brooklyn, the Justice De-
partment sought access to the medical records of Baby Jane Doe in
order to determine whether a violation of her federal civil rights
(guaranteeing equal protection of the laws to disabled persons)
had been violated. Stony Brook Hospital, where Baby Jane Doe
was born and where she remained, refused to cooperate by provid-
ing the infant's medical records to Justice Department investiga-
tors, the Surgeon General of the United States, and investigators
from the United States Department of Health and Human
Services. 8 6
In this early test of reissued Baby Doe Rules, United States Dis-
trict Court Judge Leonard D. Wexler of New York ruled that the
evidence in the case "conclusively established there is no discrimi-
nation."87 The Judge observed that the parents had made a choice
between two medically acceptable alternatives: surgery versus
non-surgical care. He concluded that if the operations had been
performed, "the infant would live longer-as a vegetable, para-
lyzed, disabled .... 88
A new outburst of public sentiment followed the Baby Jane Doe
decision. Meeting in Washington, D.C., on November 30, 1983, vari-
ous doctors' groups and disability rights organizations issued a
joint statement that the basis for deciding whether to withhold
treatment should never be tied to a person's disability-even
where uncertainty exists as to whether the treatment will have
truly beneficial consequences.8 9 The groups further agreed, how-
ever, that "it is ethically and legally justified to withhold medical or
surgical procedures which ... will only prolong the act of dying."90
Finally, the groups contended that the determination of the course
of treatment to follow should hinge solely on the medical condition
of the individual at risk, rather than on the limited potential of
such an individual or the lack of available community resources
needed to compensate for the handicap.91
The tragic saga of Baby Jane Doe will continue to be rewritten
daily; some cases will be noticed, others will not. It is hoped that
these stories can be reckoned with, not in an atmosphere of jour-
86. Id.
87. See Barringer, Judge Rejects Federal Role in 'Baby Doe' Case, Wash. Post,
Nov. 24, 1983, at A5, col. 4.
88. Id. The Justice Department unsucessfully appealed the decision of Judge
Wexler to a federal appeals court. See United States v. University Hosp., 729
F.2d 144 (1984). See also Barringer, 'Baby Doe' Ruling Appealed by Justice
Department, Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 1983, at A5, coL 4.
89. See Barringer, 'Baby Doe' Takes Turn for Worse; Legal Fight Accelerates,
Wash. Post., Nov. 30, 1983, at A2, col. 1.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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nalistic sensationalism and bureaucratic intermeddling, but rather
in an informed medical and familial setting, where love and hu-
maneness are basic elements of the decisionmaking process. Bar-
ring the most extreme circumstances of parental disability,92
decisions affecting Baby Doe families should not be made by those
outside the immediate circle of family concern. As one commenta-
tor has explained, "the inevitable agony will be much less if these
decisions, and any mistakes, are left to the families involved; most
often the families will decide on the basis of love, and in any event
it is the family that must live with the resulting burden or guilt."93
IV. SEARCHING FOR A WORKABLE STANDARD
A. Technical/Medical Criteria
The Baby Doe Rules warn against discriminatory denial of
"nourishment and medically beneficial treatment (as determined
with respect for reasonable medical judgment)" 94 and "customary
medical care."95 This naive concept of customary medical care is
simply a mirage in the frequently difficult and tragic cases of se-
verely handicapped infants; such a standard does not presently ex-
ist. Responding to such uncertainties, this Article will try to
provide a framework for determining a standard of medical care
for infants born with birth defects and, in turn, establish the roots
of a more workable process of principled decisionmaking. It
should be stressed that this Article does not propose a rigid, mono-
lithic standard of medical care. Any standard for determining the
treatment of defective infants must steer a course between the ab-
sence of standard (as exists under the federal regulations) and the
adoption of an overly rigid standard. Flexibility is important in
this sensitive undertaking.
Neonatal intensive care units, developed largely in university
medical centers, now permit care to save all infants except the
very premature-those weighing less than one and one-half
pounds.9 6 Those infants weighing more than one and one-half
92. See infra notes 114-126 and accompanying text.
93. Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1983, at 30, col. 1.
94. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,651 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.54).
95. Id.
96. Steinmann, The Baby Savers, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 68.
As early as 1975, one of the most advanced newborn intensive care units in
the country (with thirty-six beds, staffed by eight pediatricians, two pediatric
anesthesiologists, a neurologist, and fifty-seven specially trained nurses),
was opened at The Babies Hospital in The Columbia Presbyterian Medical
Center. Id. At Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, Florida, seventy beds
comprise a similar unit. See Sternberg, Lying Hopelessly Ill, Infant Tests New
Law of Hospital Survival, Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 1983, at A4, col. 1.
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pounds are considered to be "salvageable" and almost no medical
technique and assistance will be denied to such infants.
Statistics indicate that American physicians tend to follow this
birth weight standard in determining whether intensive, or aggres-
sive treatment (e.g. machine-assisted respiration) should be un-
dertaken. A recent report of infant births in the United States
disclosed the fact that infants in the 501-750 gram range (1 lb. 1%
oz. to 1 lb. 101/ oz.) are oftentimes treated aggressively. Those in
the 751-1,000 gram range (1 lb. 1014 oz. to 2 lb. 3 oz.) are commonly
treated in an aggressive manner, while those infants weighing
more than 1,000 grams (2 lb. 3 oz.) at birth are routinely treated
aggressively.97
In contrast, intensive care in Britain and Sweden is generally
reserved for infants over 750 grams. 98 Conversely, when an infant
weighs less than 750 grams, it is seldom subjected to aggressive
care. As a consequence of this general policy, fewer disabilities
result in British and Swedish infants of low birth-weight from ag-
gressive treatment than in the United States.99
An infant with a very low birth-weight is susceptible to brain
injuries, which in turn may result in associated handicaps such as
mental retardation and cerebral palsy, and sustained treatment
may only be obtained at considerable financial expense.OO It has
therefore been suggested that a cut-off weight be set at 1,000 grams
(about two pounds, three ounces), below which aggressive treat-
ment could be justifiably withheld.O1 Another viable alternative
would be to withhold aggressive infant care when a birth weight of
1,000 grams or less is recorded for those born in a state of severe
asphyxiation.102
It should be emphasized that nonaggressive care does not mean
"no care." Rather, it has been termed as conservative care, and is
recognized to be a less intensive mode of therapy designed to pro-
mote the newborn's comfort and well-being. Nonaggressive care
97. Young, Caring for Disabled Infants, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1983, at
15.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. One recent report of typical costs for infants who were born with a weight
greater than 500 grams, and who were admitted at the University of Califor-
nia, San Francisco, Moffitt Hospital from July 1976 to 1978, showed the aver-
age total charge was $8,069, while the median total charge was $3,610. In five
cases out of 1,185 admissions, total charges were greater than $100,000. In
nineteen cases, the total charges were in the range of $50,000 to $99,999. In 153
cases, the bill ranged from $10,000 to $19,000. Strong, The Tiniest Newborns, 13
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1983, at 14, 16.
101. Id. at 14 (discussing the suggestion made by an obstetrician in Kirkley, Fetal
Survival, 137 Am. J. OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 873 (1980)).
102. Id. at 15.
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may be performed by maintaining the distressed infant's warmth,
periodically providing fluids, and placing the infant under an oxy-
gen hood in order to prevent cyanosis.O 3
It should also be stressed that an infant's birth weight is only
one factor to be weighed into the decision to withhold intensive
treatment. Selective non-treatment should be administered on the
basis of a determination, made by the family and its physicians,
which would focus on factors other than just weight, such as the
potential for quality of sustained life and economic considerations
of cost-effectiveness in saving and promoting a particular life.104
Genetic factors are also frequently considered. The most com-
monly agreed upon genetic factors that would justify the withhold-
ing or discontinuation of aggressive therapies are tied to severe
abnormalities, diseases, or damages to an infant's central nervous
system. "Severe afflictions" would include cases of
hydranencephaly, 0 5 severe neural tube defects,1 0 6 gross
hydrocephalus107 (if complicated by infection), and specific chro-
mosomal disorders such as trisomy 13 and 18.108 Additional cases
might include infants with extensive and fully documented brain
damage after asphyxia and hemorrhage.10 9
Examples abound of instances where action was taken by the
government to force parents or physicians to treat or sustain in-
fants in the most tragic of conditions.11o On April 11, 1983, in Coos
County, Oregon, the Baby Doe saga was repeated. On that date, an
infant girl was born suffering from multiple defects: her skull was
formed with a membrane sac containing fluids and brain parts
103. Id.
104. Id. at 17.
105. This may be described as a developmental disorder of the nervous system
which results in large fluid-filled cavities within the brain. BLAKISTON'S
GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 632 (1979).
106. This may be described as a disorder characterized by distention of the brain
with cerebrospinal fluid. Id. at 633.
107. The neural tube is the embryonic tube that "differentiates into brain and spi-
nal cord." Id. at 905.
108. Trisomy 13 and 18 are chromosomal defects characterized by severe mental
retardation, seizures, and various physical deformities. Id. at 1405.
109. See Young, supra note 85, at 15.
110. For example, the leading English case of In re B (Minor) overruled a lower
court decision respecting a parental decision which "in the kindest ... inter-
ests of the child" forbade surgical correction of an intestinal blockage of a
mongoloid infant. The court ruled that the infant was entitled to a "happy
life" insofar as a person suffering from mongolism could enjoy such a life, and
that the corrective surgery would assure that life. While not structuring a
conclusive standard for subsequent decisionmaking in such cases, the court
indicated that there may well be "awful" cases where the life of the child
would be so full of pain and suffering that it would be better to end it. C.A.
1981, 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1424.
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hanging from the back of her head. As a consequence of her mas-
sive brain damage, a number of her bodily functions were cur-
tailed. She was unable to see or hear, she had neither sucking nor
swallowing reflexes, and was unable to eat without special intrave-
nous or forced feeding."'
Acting on a telephone call regarding the alleged nonfeeding of
the infant, the Oregon Right to Life group took immediate action.
The group not only alerted the state health department, but also
used the Baby Doe Hotline to fly a federal team of investigators to
Oregon from the United States Department of Health and Human
Services. While there was no disagreement among the interested
parties that the baby's death was imminent, in spite of the treat-
ment that she could receive, the Oregon Right to Life group sought
"to show that the child should not be starved to death."112 A
spokesman for the group explained: "We felt it was no more ap-
propriate to starve the child than to inject it with something that
would kill her outright, which everyone agrees is not proper."n1 3
Although refusing to find the parents' medically supported orders
to end the feeding of the infant to be negligent, the Circuit Court
directed intravenous feeding to be attempted while an appeal was
perfected to the Oregon Court of Appeals. Mercifully, the baby
died before further court action." 4
Other instances also suggest that miracles of modern medicine
may be but curses to those who are recipients. Consider, for exam-
ple, the case of Andrew Stinson, who was born fifteen and one-half
weeks premature, and who weighed only one pound, twelve
ounces, at birth. Because of "heroic" medical efforts, six grueling
months elapsed before the infant finally found peace through
death."5 Mrs. Stinson felt that the use of so-called "heroic and ex-
perimental technology" on her son was a moral outrage and was
applied in callous disrespect for the sacredness of human life,
rather than in respect for it.116
Another example of a case where modern medicine could be
said to have acted more as a curse than a miracle can be found in
the vivid description of the agony of a small child, kept alive
through the grace of modern technology:
111. See Hilts, Brain-Damaged Baby Dies Amid Court Fight Over Treatment,
Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 1983, at A2, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Hilts, Baby Dies].
112. Id.
113. Id. See also G. WIUzAms, THE SANcTrrY OF LFE AND THE CRnmNAL LAw 25-35
(1958).
114. See Hilts, Baby Dies, supra note 111.
115. See Stinson & Stinson, On the Death of a Baby, 244 ATI Moimty 64passim
(1979). See generally R. STINSON & P. STINSON THE LONG DYn G OF A BABY
(1983) [hereinafter cited as STINSON & STINSON].
116. See generally STINSON & STINSON, supra note 115.
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The child lies motionless inside the Plexiglass incubator.... She weighs
24 ounces and is two months old. Tubes, five in all, carry nutrients into her
body and carry wastes away. She is covered with scabs. Her skin is yel-
low and slowly dying. Two weeks ago, infection ravaged her small intes-
tine. Her body is stiff: poor circulation and blood teeming with bacteria
have caused a condition similar to rigor mortis. When this little girl begins
to die, she will not be resuscitated, her parents and her doctor have de-
cided. She is taking up a bed that could be used for a potential
survivor.
11 7
This baby, termed Jackson Miami's "Baby Doe," was the subject of
heroic life-sustaining measures since its birth.118 Typically, the
costs of such care run from $6,000 to $80,000.119 Even greater than
the economic costs are the physical costs to the infant itself. As
one of the nurses caring for the Jackson Baby Doe put it, "that
poor baby is suffering." 2 0
These tragic cases underscore the importance of considering
the potential benefit to be derived from intensive treatment. A
vast array of surgical techniques can now preserve life for weeks
or even months, in spite of severe defects. For example, prompt
surgery can save children with spina bifida (exposure of the spinal
cord) from death, but treatment rarely can save them from lives of
partial paralysis, mental retardation, and a complete dependence
upon others for assistance in discharging the simplest body func-
tions. 121 The lives of grossly premature infants who have severe
cases of mental retardation (due to oxygen deprivation during
birth) can also be saved as a consequence of modern neonatal in-
tensive care procedures. While surgery is successful in otherwise
correcting life-threatening cardiac and intestinal defects which are
commonly associated with Down's Syndrome, the same surgical
gift cannot alter mental retardation which, in turn, is caused by
Down's Syndrome. 22
A study conducted in the early 70's at Children's Hospital in
Sheffield, England, provides another set of guidelines for deter-
mining when care may be withheld from handicapped infants.123
The Sheffield study focused on the presence of those conditions
that dictate that the infant will either die early (e.g., within nine
months), regardless of the care given, or will suffer severe multi-
system handicaps that preclude the child from living an independ-
ent, dignified life, or enjoying meaningful interpersonal relations.
117. See Sternberg, supra note 96, at A4, col. 1.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 345, 396 n.2
(D.D.C. 1983).
122. Id.
123. See McCormick, supra note 10, at 339.
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The following defects were found to merit the withholding of
treatment:
1. Thoracolumbar or thoracolumbosacral lesion (lesion on the thoracic
and lumbar parts of the spine).
2. Gross paralysis with a neurologic segmental level at L3.
3. Kyphosis or scoliosis (abnormal curvature of vertebral column).
4. Gross hydrocephalus (accumulation of fluid within the brain) with a
head circumference at least two centimeters above the ninetieth per-
centile related to birth weight.
5. Other gross congenital defects, such as cyanotic heart disease (cardiac
malformation causing insufficient oxygenation of the blood).
6. Intracranial (brain) birth injury.1 2 4
The recent statistical studies that have disclosed that the
number of disabled babies born in the United States has doubled
within the last twenty-five years are sobering.125 The study re-
leased by the National Center for Health Statistics revealed that
140,000 babies born this year will suffer from some type of physical
abnormality, mental retardation, or learning disability.126 In the
late 1950's, there were only about 70,000 such abnormal births.127
The medical, social and economic implications of this increase in
disabled infants are significant, since it translates into a substan-
tial financial commitment and, indeed, burden to society. The full
effect of the cost outlay has yet to be calculated. For example,
there has been a 15 percent increase in the number of children en-
rolled in some form of special education since 1975-with federal
service costs at over one billion dollars a year.
B. The Role of Parents in Decisionmaking
While the most universal relation in nature is that between par-
ent and child,128 there is a discernible modern legislative trend to-
ward replacing the traditional deference to parental authority with
a new emphasis on child welfare. 2 9 In 1973, the dominant judicial
attitude in settling disputes concerning children was to inquire
whether the best interests or welfare of the child would be
served.130 In 1979, however, a neo-conservative attitude was advo-
cated, and is gaining respect, which directs judicial restraint and
124. Lorber, Early Results of Selective Treatment of Spina Bifida Cystica, 4 BR.
MED. J. 201, 204 (1973). See also PEDIATRIC NEWS, Nov. 1974 at 8, 11.
125. Lyons, Disabilities in U.S. Babies Found to Have Doubled in 25 Years, Int'l
Herald Tribune, July 21, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *446.
129. See, e.g., Dickens, The Modern Function and Limits of Parental Rights, 97
L.Q. REV. 462, 463-65 (1981).
130. See id. at 467. See also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNrr, BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS OF ThE CHiLD (1973).
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discourages state intervention when "children issues" arise.131 As
one commentator has noted, state intervention must be tempered:
"[s ]o long as the child is part of a viable family, his own interests
are merged with those of the other members. Only after the family
fails in its function should the child's interests become a matter for
State intrusion."13 2 Thus, before a child's interest can be protected
individually, the government must make a showing that the par-
ent, or parents, are operating in a fashion that is not consistent
with principles of family solidarity and privacy. 33
Modern parents, under the neo-conservative analysis, should
exercise autonomy over the medical needs of their children.134
The crucial task is to find the point at which parental choices so
harm the child's welfare as to justify state intervention.135 It has
been suggested that unless death is a likely consequence of the
parental decision, there is no justification for governmental intru-
sion.136 An ameliorated position could state that only unreasona-
ble parental actions warrant intervention. Introducing the
standard of reasonableness gives wider significance and respect to
parental autonomy. It is also a more realistic approach to deci-
sional matters in this sphere of consideration.
The standard of reasonableness is always flexible and respon-
sive to individual factual applications. This flexibility may be en-
hanced through interpretation and application of social policies
emerging from each particular situation. Forces of reasonableness
and social policy are balanced as justice or equity is sought in indi-
vidual cases. The element of reasonable discretion must be ac-
corded to the family in its unique position of knowledge.
Determinations of the best interests of one family member must
by necessity be based upon individual family beliefs in social, eco-
nomic, and spiritual values. Each case must be considered individ-
ually, according to the context in which it arises. The proposed
construct for decisionmaking is thus a mere aid to the difficult pro-
cess, not an unyielding a priori ethic.
As a concert master in an orchestra assists his fellow musicians
in tuning and seeks to establish whether they are in pitch before
performing, he has-unless suffering from tone deafness-devel-
oped an innate ability to determine the tonality or pitch (or, as the
case may be, "intonality") of the group. It may be a sense devel-
oped over years of early musical training, but every acknowledged
131. See Dickens, supra note 129, at 467.
132. J. GoLDsTFEn, A. FREUD, & A. SoL=fr, supra note 130, at 1.
133. See Dickens, supra note 129, at 1.
134. See J. GOLsTEmN, A. FREUD, & A. SOufrr, supra note 130, at 112.
135. See Dickens, supra note 129, at 472.
136. See J. GODsTmN, A. FREUD, & A. SohLrr, supra note 130, at 92.
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concert master has it, and most other musicians have it as well.
Similarly, one does not need to read laws or interpret judicial deci-
sions holding forth on what is or is not pornographic. As one
Supreme Court Justice asserted, one knows obscenity when he
sees it-and most average, ordinary, reasonable people would
agree.
When a parent exceeds the standard of reasonable conduct re-
garding a newly born handicapped infant, decisive action should
be taken by the state to protect the infant. An inherent sense of
conscience, decency, or humaneness directs all loving parents.
This assumes, of course, that the parents are themselves intelli-
gent and contributing members of society. Obviously in those
cases where the parents are not competent members of society,
the state must stand ready to pierce the familial veil of privacy
where the parents are incapable of making mature, reasonable,
and loving judgments regarding the medical treatment of their
newborn. One could, for example, well imagine a case of a four-
teen year-old, drug dependent, and economically insecure young
girl giving birth to a neonate. Due to her illness, modest economic
circumstances, and lack of sophistication, such a mother may de-
cide to try to prevent heroic measures from being undertaken on
an infant determined "salvageable" by her attending physicians.
In this situation, the state would be justified-indeed, compelled-
to act. Similarly, when confused religious purposes supposedly
"compel" parents to withhold emergency blood transfusions or
surgical interventions, the state must intervene to protect the
infant.137
While familial self-determination cannot remain unfettered and
unchallenged, intrusions by the state should only be tolerated
when familial judgment-based on consultation with wise and
faithfully objective medical providers--"so exceeds the limits of
reason" that the best interests of the incapacitated member are be-
ing flagrantly disregarded. 38 Stated conversely, a parent will be
considered primafacie inadequate when he or she suffers a disa-
bling mental illness, retardation, drug addiction, or major charac-
ter defect. 39 These criteria evince an objectivity that has been
lacking in past judicial evaluations, which were based on the best
interests of the child.140
137. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witness v. King County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (sus-
taining state law ordering treatment for children who are medically neglected
by their religious parents). See also G. SmrrH, supra note 9, at 41-44; L. TRmE,
AMERICAN CONSTrroTIONAL LAW 850-59 (1978).
138. McCormick, supra note 10, at 378.
139. See Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. I REV. 423, 489
(1983).
140. See, e.g., In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, (court refused to
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C. Quality of Life and Extraordinary Care
From a Judaeo-Christian theological perspective, the meaning,
the substance, and, indeed, the consummation of life is tied to two
inextricable expressions of love: love of God and love of neighbor.
It is through love of others that God is recognized and loved.141
The meaning of life under this interpretation, then, is to be found
in human relationships and the qualities of respect, concern, com-
passion, and justice that support such relationships.142
Traditional philosophical thought on preserving life acknowl-
edges that grave hardships may occur that make the preservation
of life an extraordinary and, hence, nonobligatory function.143 An
extraordinary situation may arise when the infant suffers the
"grave inconvenience" of living a life in a grossly mutilated body
and when the future offers only pain with little or no chance of
recovery.1' The means for saving life also become extraordinary
when the life that would be saved is lacking in quality in one form
or another. A life is lacking in quality if continued existence would
severely jeopardize the oppressed individual's opportunity to
grasp and seek the overall meaning of life. This life goal has been
termed the "relational-potential," and is described as the "growth
in love of God and neighbor" through human relationships.145
Under these circumstances, the individual's ability to nurture and
maintain human relationships is so threatened and strained by the
tragic physical condition of the infant that this goal can not be ful-
filled.146 Finally, where the financial cost of preserving life is so
overwhelming that it would create grave hardship for the family,
order treatment for a child with a heart defect and Down's Syndrome, on the
ground that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the child was
not being provided with the necessities of life), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949
(1980).
141. St. John wrote: "If any man says I love God and hates his brother, he is a liar.
For he who loves not his brother, whom he sees, how can he love God, whom
he does not see?" 1 John 4:20-21 (King James). See McCormick, supra note
10, at 346.
142. See also McCormick supra note 10, at 346; Morison, Implications of Prenatal
Diagnosis for the Quality of, and Right to, Human Life, in BIOMEDICAL ETH-
ICS AND THE LAw 329 (J. Humber & R. Almeder eds. 1976).
143. See McCormick, supra note 10, at 347.
144. It has been urged that society and medicine stop "perpetuating the fiction
that withholding treatment is ethically different from terminating life. It is
time that society begins to discuss mechanisms by which we can alleviate the
pain and suffering for those individuals whom we cannot help." Freeman, Is
There a Right to Die-Quickly?, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 354, 356 (S.
Gorovitz ed. 1976).
145. McCormick, supra note 10, at 349.
146. Id. at 347. Extraordinary measures undertaken to prolong a life of suffering
are unjust to the individual in question and to the societal standard of de-
cency and humanity. G. SMrrH, supra note 9, at 9.
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medical care should be considered extraordinary, and therefore,
nonobligatory.
Social justice demands that each individual be given an oppor-
tunity to maximize his individual potential. Yet, a point is often
reached where maintenance of an individual is in defiance of all
concepts of basic humanitarianism and social justice. When an in-
dividual's condition is such that it represents a negation of any
"truly human" qualities or "relational-potential,"' 47 then the best
form of treatment should be no treatment at all.
Life should not be viewed as an end in and of itself, but rather
as something that should be preserved so that other values can be
fulfilled. Life should only be preserved when it holds a potentiality
for human relationships. Although this standard does not admit of
mathematical precision and must be applied with great humility
and caution, it is nonetheless a beginning from which particular
medical formulations may be developed.
Little disagreement is likely to be found with the conclusion
that an anacepholic infant (one without a brain) has no capacity to
develop a "relational-potential." The same conclusion could not be
said of an infant with Down's Syndrome. 4 8 In the final analysis, a
"relational-potential" test is needed which is applied "to presump-
tive biological systems for the gray area between such ex-
tremes."' 4 9 Even with this, however, the decisions will have to be
made by the parents, relying on the integrity and professionalism
147. See McCormick, supra note 10, at 349.
148. Id. at 350.
149. Id. A number of specific factors may be considered in testing the capacity or
potential for social relationship: the relative likelihood of success of the cor-
rective surgical intervention; the patient's life expectancy; the familial cir-
cumstances (i.e., financial and psychological stability); and the potential for
the individual's contributions. Rescher, The Allocation of Exotic Medical
Lifesaving Therapy, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 523, 526-29 (S. Gorovitz
ed. 1976).
One study showed conclusively that physicians normally evaluate the
chronically or terminally-ill in terms of not only the physiological aspects of
the case, but also in terms of the extent to which the patient is capable of
interacting with others. Patients determined unsalvageable are typically not
treated heroically. In determining salvageability, the patient's potential ca-
pacity to perform its social roles is crucial. Salvageability, then, is based
upon a physician's determination of whether his patient can be restored to
health or can, in a chronic state, be maintained for an indefinite period of
time. The quality of life that the patient may enjoy if maintained or rehabili-
tated is a significant-if not crucial-determination. See D. CRANE, THE SANC-
TrrY OF SOCIAL LIFE: PHYSICIANS TREATMENT OF CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS 11,
14, 119 (1975).
Of course, the important point to be remembered is that the exact manner,
weight and application of these factors in the balancing test must depend
upon the situation of each case.
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of medical personnel.150 If a grossly deformed infant enjoys no po-
tential for developing or enjoying relationships with others, or if
there is a potential but it would remain undeveloped in a basic
struggle to survive, then it can be said that that infant's life has
achieved its greatest potential.151 Under these circumstances, it
may be concluded that such an infant should be allowed to die be-
cause no extraordinary means are merited. Since the condition of
the infant is extraordinary, the means of treatment are, in turn,
extraordinary. 5 2
The concepts of ordinary versus extraordinary life-sustaining
processes are highly relative, not only to time and locale, but also
in their application to individual cases. 153 The concepts of ordi-
nary and extraordinary treatment, in essence, serve as value judg-
ments which determine whether a given mode of treatment poses
an undue hardship on the patient or provides hope for a direct ben-
efit.154 If a particular mode of medical or surgical intervention
either imposes too great a hardship on the patient, or could offer
no reasonable hope of benefit, the treatment could be correctly
viewed as extraordinary and, thus, nonobligatory. 55
Concern must be expressed regarding the patient's comfort in
the remaining days of his life, if such an extraordinary act is un-
dertaken or withheld. This determination of whether contem-
plated treatment is ordinary or extraordinary is essentially a
quality of life statement. 5 6 In coming to this quality of life state-
ment, we knowingly or unknowingly use a substituted judgment to
conclude that, if we were in a similar situation, we would (or would
not) wish to survive in such a state of impairment. Decisions of
this nature are made within a vortex of deep emotionalism. They
can be aided-but certainly never validated-by using the con-
struct posited here.
Since the binding force of life is love, then it can be argued that
man should endeavor to maximize a response to love in whatever
life situations man finds himself. 157 If an act renders more harm
than good to the individual concerned, and to those around him,
the act would properly be viewed as unloving. The crucial point of
understanding is that a basic cost/benefit analysis is almost al-
ways undertaken--consciously or unconsciously. Of course, the
150. McCormick, supra note 10, at 350.
151. Id. at 349. See generally Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective
Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1975).
152. Id.
153. R. McCoRMIcK, NOTES ON MORAL THEOLOGY, 1965 THROUGH 1980, at 565 (1981).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Fletcher, Love is the Only Measure, 83 COMMONWEAL 427 (1966).
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methodology utilized in this assessment will be situational and in-
capable of absolute determination.158 Of necessity, the basic norm
or standard to be used will be love.
Moral obligations must arise from more than mere situations or
consequences.' 59 The measurement of a defective infant's poten-
tial for developing human relationships serves as a valuable and
rational construct for determining the newborn's future. The situ-
ation ethic of love is complemented and magnified when engrafted
onto the relational-potential standard.
In a recent statement, President Reagan deplored the outcome
of the original Indiana "Baby Doe" case.160 "The real question to-
day," the President suggested, "is not when human life begins, but,
What is the value of human life. '161 The three pivotal words in this
statement are "value," and "human life." Value should be evalu-
ated in relation to the infant, its parents, and society. Agreed med-
ical standards of "life," and its potential for humanity, can be
crucial in this probing.
Every person is, to be sure, of equal value. If a proper relation-
ship is established, however, between the words, "life," "equal,"
and "value," then it cannot be maintained that every life is of equal
value.162 If "life" is taken to mean the continuation of vital
processes, "value" to mean a good life to the concerned individual,
and "equal" to mean either "identical" or "the same" (especially as
to treatment), then it is incorrect to maintain that "every life is of
equal value."163 The concept of "equal value" is valid, as it simply
means that all efforts must be made in order to avoid unjust dis-
crimination in providing health care and life support mechanisms.
Not all discrimination, or inequality of treatment, is unjust. The
threat of unjust discrimination is bypassed totally if the process of
decisionmaking focuses on patient benefit, in terms of a quality-of-
life standard.164
While a person has a value of incalculable worth, there are situ-
158. See R. McCoRMIcK, supra note 153, at 77.
159. See id. at 650.
160. Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation, 9 HuMAN LIFE REV. 7
(1983).
161. Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).
162. See McCormick, supra note 10, at 350, 397. One of the world's greatest
genetecists, the late Professor Theodosius Dobzhansky of Columbia Univer-
sity, observed that human equality is but an ethical precept, not a biological
phenomenon. T. DOBZHANSKY, GENETIC DivERsrrY AND HUmAN EQUALITY 4
(1973).
163. McCormick, supra note 10, at 397.
164. Id. No absolute prohibition against the taking of human life can be inferred
from recognition of the premise that life is sacred. See D. CALLAAN, ABOR-
TION: LAW, CHOICE, AND MORAIrTY 453-54 (1970); R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING
AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION chs. 3, 5 (1976).
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ations in which continued physical existence offers no benefits. As
such, to maintain "life" could well be regarded as an assault on the
infant, itself, and on its very dignity.165
Dr. Joseph Fletcher has assembled a proffie of those fifteen
qualities, attitudes, or indicators of humanhood. According to Dr.
Fletcher, to be considered "human" a child must possess: minimal
intelligence, as those below a 20 I.Q. mark in a Stanford-Benet test
are not considered persons; self-awareness; self-control; time con-
sciousness; a sense of futurity tied to a theological assertion; a
sense of the past, or memory; a capability to relate to others; an
ability to express concern for others; an ability to communicate;
the ability to assert control in life-directing situations and not dis-
165. McCormick, supra note 10, at 396.
Various groups have considered these and related problems. In Canada, it
was suggested recently that decisions to treat or not to treat defective
newborns should be made according to the medical facts of each case, should
be reasonable, in the best interests of the patient, and in conformity with
pertinent standards set out by the criminal law. Acceptable quality of life is
essentially a question of fact that differs in each case. Yet it is also a question
of sound medical judgment, based in turn upon medical experience, as well
as consultations with the concerned party or parties such as parents, spouse,
family, and next of kin. See LAw REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, EuTHANAsLA,
AIDING SUICIDE AND CESSATION OF TREATMENT 24-26 (1983).
The A.M.A. has adopted the following position:
Quality of Life. In the making of decisions for the treatment of seri-
ously deformed newborns ... the primary consideration should be
what is best for the individual patient and not the avoidance of a bur-
den to the family or to society. Quality of life is a factor to be consid-
ered in determining what is best for the individual. Life should be
cherished despite disabilities and handicaps, except when prolonga-
tion would be inhumane and unconscionable. Under these circum-
stances, withholding or removing life supporting means is ethical
provided that the normal care given an individual who is ill is not
discontinued. In desperate situations involving newborns, the advice
and judgment of the physician should be available, but the decision
whether to exert maximal efforts to sustain life should be the choice
of the parents....
The presumption is that the love which parents usually have for
their children will be dominant in the decisions which they make in
determining what is in the best interest of their children. It is to be
expected that parents will act unselfishly, particularly where life it-
self is at stake. Unless there is convincing evidence to the contrary,
parental authority should be respected.
CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AM. MEDICAL ASS'N 9
(1982).
A Presidential Commission reached conclusions similar to those of the
A.M.A. The Commission went on to recommend that specific procedures be
established for internal review of decisions regarding nontreatment for the
handicapped at risk newborn. To that end, the formation of ethic review com-
mittees was suggested. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECID-
ING TO FOREGO TREATMENT 226-28 (1983).
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play utter helplessness; the ability to display curiosity instead of
indifference; changeability; rationality; the ability to be emotive
and intuitive; the ability to be idiomorphous or distinctive; and fi-
nally, the capacity for neo-cortical functions.166 Dr. Fletcher espe-
cially stressed the importance of the infant's ability to use its
brain: "In the absence of the synthesizing function of the cerebral
cortex, the person is non-existent. Such individuals are objects not
subjects.... Personal reality depends on cerebration and to be
dead 'humanly' speaking is to be ex-cerebral, no matter how long
the body remains alive."167
Dr. Fletcher's profile provides a test for determining the poten-
tial for sustaining human relationships. The deontological ethic
thus merges creatively with the situation ethic.
On a case-by-case, or situational, basis bounded by medically
166. Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhoo& A Tentative Profile of Man, 13 HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov. 1972, at 1.
167. Id. at 3. The essential quality of humanness is the possession of the potential
for participating in human activities which comes from possessing a function-
ing brain. See B. BRODY, ABORTION AND THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LI"E: A
PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW 114 (1975).
In order to continue to exist as a human-another viewpoint holds-one
must possess an actually or potentially functioning heart, lung, or brain.
Thus, it is only when a human possesses none of these that he ceases to exist.
This view holds that a fetus may be regarded as a member of humanity when
it acquires one of these. P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 96 (1970).
Yet another standard is posited for decisionmaking.
As long as we have any means of combatting the primary disease
with any hope of success, we will use every mode of therapy avail-
able to maintain life. However, when there is no therapeutic ap-
proach of any value left, we feel that we must let the patient die as
peacefully and comfortably as possible. Be it injection or hemor-
rhage, cardiac or respiratory arrest, we will not use extreme meas-
ures to combat it, only to let the child the next day die from the same
or from another cause.
Toch, Too Young to Die, in PSYcHOsocIAL ASPECTS OF TERmINAL CARE 65, 74
(B. Schoenberg, A. Carr, D. Peretz, & A. Kutscher eds. 1972).
Still another view regarding the status of personhood is that a human be-
ing becomes a person only when the attainment of higher mental capacities
is recognized and charted. Being a subject of non-momentary interests
makes a person, together with the possession of a sense of time, a concept of
a continuing subject of mental states and a capacity for thought episodes.
Humans, thus, may become quasi-persons reasonably at about three months.
Empirical evidence concerning the psychological and neurophysiological de-
velopment of human beings thus leads to the conclusion that it is most un-
likely that the very new born infants are even quasi-persons, let alone
persons. At best-according to this view-infanticide may destroy but a
quasi-person. M. TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE 34-36, 411, 419-21 (1983).
For children with diseases that involve pain and for which no hope for
survival exists, prolongation of life should not be sought. Englehardt, Ethical
Issues in Aiding the Death of Young Children, in BENEFICIENT EUTHANASIA
180, 187, 189 (M. Kohl ed. 1975).
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approved guidelines, the decisionmakers will balance the gravity
of the harm caused by extraordinary care, against the utility of the
good that will come from such extraordinary actions. Deci-
sionmakers should be ever-mindful of the ethical imperative to
minimize human suffering at all levels when making their ultimate
decisions. Father McCormick has suggested that decisionmakers
should evaluate the infant's "potential" for the development of
human relationships in light of the possibility that this hard-won
potential-even assuming it exists-may be lost in the extraordi-
nary care's drain on time, attention, and social-economic re-
sources. This balancing test validates a cost-benefit analysis.16 8
D. The Role of the Federal Government
Federal involvement in the decision to administer or withhold
life-sustaining measures for defective newborns need not neces-
sarily be in the form of intervention. If the federal government ex-
pressed its legislative concern for protecting human life in less
intrusive ways, federal actions could, instead, be designed to pro-
vide cooperative assistance.
Rather than the Bioethical Review Committees envisioned in
the federal Baby Doe regulations, 169 local hospitals should utilize
their expertise in health care issues to promote "ethics advisory
committees." These ethics advisory committees would assist the
parents of newly born handicapped children by reaching in-
dependent assessments of whether conditions are so extraordi-
nary that heroic action would be useless. The etiology of such
committees could be traced to present clinical pathological confer-
ences, which serve as an integral part of standard hospital proce-
dures. Routinely, the clinician who cared for a diseased patient
describes the rationale for his diagnosis and the course of therapy
that he followed; then the pathologist describes the post mortem
findings. Thus, any errors in diagnostic judgment are discovered,
but they are discovered after the fact.170 Introducing an ethical
perspective in order to determine the ethical bases of treatment or
non-treatment, and aggressive or conservative treatment, would
shape the development of an ethical tribunal.
These ethics advisory committees could be composed of a wide
sampling of independent individuals representing legal, ethical,
medical, social, religious, and lay interests. Their opinions would
never be imposed, but would instead only be triggered upon a fain-
168. See Cohn, Let Deformed Babies Die, G U Jesuit Says, Wash. Post, July 7, 1974,
at A6, col. 1.
169. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
170. Dagi, The Ethical Tribunal in Medicine, in 1 ETHIcAL, LEGAL AND SocAL
CHALLENGES TO A BRAvE NEW WORLD 201, 208 (G. Smith ed. 1982).
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ily request for their services. The ethics advisory committee would
become an adjunct to the already existing family support mecha-
nism of advisers, giving their counsel either before, or during, a
crisis. The family unit itself, however, would make the ultimate
decision regarding disposition of the case. The obvious advantage
of this proposal is that it could function independent of a complex
regulatory scheme. Through custom and usage, the committees
could provide the direction and stability necessary to establish a
standard medical practice for the treatment of handicapped
newborns.
The ICRC's contemplated in the federal Baby Doe regulations
differ radically from the proposed ethics advisory committees. En-
forcement of a federal regulatory scheme through the "Baby Doe"
regulations is offensive, in part because of its superimposition onto
a federal scheme. As it appears to be emerging, an investigation
by ICRC's could be triggered upon request by any committee
member or a concerned member of the public. This would be an
intrusion into the privacy and autonomy of the family. Committee
"action" should be considered efficacious only if requested by the
family or its designated agents (e.g., physicians). Furthermore,
the ICRC's would serve as little more than an information gather-
ing body for federal investigations.
Government concern and direction would be welcome if it were
designed to decrease the number of premature infants born each
year by increasing the funding for programs that provide food and
prenatal care for expectant mothers. Coordinated state and fed-
eral legislative schemes to promote voluntary educational pro-
grams for genetic screening before marriage would also reduce the
tragedy of handicapped infants.' 7 ' Federal regulation of contami-
nants and chemical pollutants could also reduce the incidence of
genetic deformity. The federal government could establish a fed-
eral advisory task force charged with the responsibility of sug-
gesting guidelines for a classification of birth diseases and
problems which would merit a standard of acceptable medical
treatment. There must be an unequivocal governmental policy
that ensures that all handicapped individuals-regardless of age-
will not be denied medical services on the basis of any handicap
whatsoever. An even more far-reaching and needed position
would be the legislative recognition that no citizen-handicapped
or otherwise-should be denied needed medical services because
of an inability to pay. 7 2
171. See generally J. FLETCHER, COPING wrH GENETIC DISORDERS (1982); P.
REILLY, GENETICS, LAw AND SocIAL PoUCY (1976).
172. See Annas, Disconnecting the Baby Doe Hotline, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
June 1983, at 14, 16.
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V. CONCLUSION
All life is sanctified by creation and, as such, is qualitative to
the individual in crisis, and to mankind in general. Indeed, man-
kind occupies a position of "sacredness in the natural, biological
order."173 The purpose of life, as previously propounded, is to ex-
press love of God through fellowship with his fellow creatures. A
parallel human goal is to minimize suffering and maximize the so-
cial good or utility of life.174 One human endeavor should not be
balanced against the other. Rather, after acknowledging the sanc-
tity of all life, the questions to be addressed are: (1) whether the
handicapped infant possesses a sustained ability to fulfill a "rela-
tionship- potential"; and (2) whether the course of medical treat-
ment minimizes suffering and maximizes the potential utility of
life. It is only at this point that a balancing process should be un-
dertaken to judge the neurophysiological capacity and the long
range capacity for quality living. The decision must then be made
as to whether ordinary measures are sufficient to nurture this po-
tential, or whether the case is so extraordinary in shared medical
opinion that little can be accomplished in seeking to advance the
potential.
Decisions in this sensitive area should be placed within the sole
province of the family, acting under a standard of reasonableness.
The family may, upon request, employ the guidance of medical, so-
cial, religious, ethical and legal advisors (i.e., an ethics advisory
committee), but need not face an inquisitorial federal government.
Aided by medically approved standards like the Sheffield List
and birth weight minimums for neonates, and by the acknowl-
edged parental attitude of love, compassion, and well-being, hard
decisions can and should be made within familial privacy. Viewed
within this total context, sanctity of creation and quality of life are
neither a palliative nor an apotheosis. Instead of being considered
grandiose principles, they should be considered as intertwined
guidelines that set the parameters for permissible action of fami-
lies in these times of trauma. Implemented in the manner in
which this Article proposes, these two guidelines remove the fed-
eral government's incentive to regulate, and intrude upon, issues
of family planning.
173. P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON xiii (1970).
174. See G. SMITH, supra note 9, at 1-4.
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